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• Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme
or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt
and their vulnerability to shocks.
• Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and
current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustaina-
bility is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. 
• A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014,
because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth pros-
pects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A
precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves dif-
ficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary.
• It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third
programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accom-
panied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a Euro-
pean boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part
of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels
prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. 
• Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-
gramme surveillance. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.
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1. Spain also entered a
financial assistance pro-
gramme in summer 2012,
which was specifically
aimed at supporting the
recapitalisation of financial
institutions. Since this is a
special assistance pro-
gramme, we do not cover it.
See:
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/assistance_eu_
ms/spain/index_en.htm.
HOW MUCH EUROPE HAS CHANGED: two years ago,
GREXIT, or potential Greek exit from the euro area,
was the main discussion. Today, policymakers are
again discussing exit, but with a decisively posi-
tive meaning: how, when and under what condi-
tions countries will exit from Troika financial
assistance programmes.
Four euro-area countries lost market access and
were forced into full macroeconomic financial
assistance programmes in 2010-13: Greece in
May 2010, Ireland in December 2010, Portugal in
May 2011 and Cyprus in April 20131.  Financial
assistance was combined with economic adjust-
ment programmes designed to put countries on a
sustainable debt path by means of a combination
of fiscal policy measures, financial and corporate
sector reforms and growth-enhancing structural
reforms.
All four programmes were scheduled to last three
years, but the initial Greek programme was termi-
nated in March 2012 and replaced by a second
programme that runs until December 2014. At the
end of their programmes, countries face in princi-
ple three options: a full or ‘clean’ exit, a new pro-
gramme or a precautionary credit line.
Ireland reached the end of its programme in
December 2013, and was able to make a clean
exit, which prompted understandable declarations
of victory by the government.  The Eurogroup also
declared the Irish exit a victory and proof that
Troika programmes work. However, critics have
pointed to the continuous risks to Ireland from lin-
gering financial problems arising from its high debt
level and the significant adjustments costs.
The Irish success led governments in Portugal and
Greece, which have programmes that are due to
expire in 2014, to announce that they are also
planning for clean exits. The issue of exit for
Cyprus is still remote as the programme will only
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expire in May 2016, though hopes of a clean exit
are no less there than elsewhere.
But despite the upbeat mood, all four countries
face public debt levels of more than 120 percent
of GDP and uncertain growth conditions (linked in
part to their high levels of private debt), which
could jeopardise the sustainability of their public
debt. If so, the current positive market sentiment
towards these countries could easily turn nega-
tive.
A defining feature for all countries will be that,
even after the end of a programme, the financial
relationship between them and their creditors will
persist for a long time. In fact, the maturities of the
European Financial Stability Facility/European
Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) loans have been
extended to around 20 years average for Ireland
and Portugal, or even in excess of 30 years for
Greece. Cyprus has a current average maturity of
about 15 years.
The first and most fundamental issue is if a coun-
try can return to, and remain in, the market at an
affordable rate. This is, above all, a question of the
sustainability of public debt. The sustainability of
debt depends on the debt and deficit levels and
on future growth and future interest rates. How-
ever, debt sustainability is also a question of
market confidence in the stability of European
Monetary Union (EMU) and the stability of the
country in question.
The second central issue is how strong the coun-
try's post-programme prospects look. While exit
might look feasible at the time the decision is
made, global shocks or country-specific setbacks
might subsequently derail market access. A coun-
try's prospects will thus depend on an assess-
ment of the likelihood of different shocks
occurring and on an accurate assessment of the
country's strengths and weaknesses.
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been repaid. The European Commission expects
the PPS of Ireland to last until 2031, given the cur-
rent repayment schedule3. PPS is integrated with
European surveillance but goes beyond it, with
more frequent missions. Similar surveillance
mechanisms have been implemented for non-
euro area EU countries that have left financial
assistance. Their experience suggests that the
surveillance is somewhat tighter than standard
European surveillance in the European Semester,
but that, de facto, there is only limited leverage
over national policy.
Instead of a clean exit, countries can opt to exit
financial assistance programmes with a precau-
tionary arrangement from the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), which might be provided via a
Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL) or
via an Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL).
Countries need to fulfil more conditions to be eli-
gible for a PCCL than for an ECCL, in exchange for
which fewer conditions are imposed on PCCL than
on ECCL beneficiaries4. A precautionary facility
could be a powerful way of making exit from a pro-
gramme more robust. When a country has
regained market access, it might be tempted to
ask for a clean exit. However, if debt levels are high
and significant negative shocks cannot be
excluded, the precautionary credit line allows the
country to issue debt safely. In case of a shock,
the country could draw on the ESM credit line with-
out having to undergo a full new application for a
new financial assistance programme. Precaution-
ary support could be perceived well by markets,
leading to lower borrowing costs and thereby
improved post-exit prospects. Furthermore, an
ECCL (but not the PCCL) might qualify the country
for the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT), which could further boost
market confidence. However, the ECB has said that
it will decide on OMT purchases case-by-case.
Although Portugal, Greece and Cyprus might meet
some of the criteria for a PCCL when they plan their
programme exits, they are unlikely to meet all.
Nonetheless, they could still obtain precautionary
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, higher eco-
nomic growth and greater job creation will be of
central importance for the success of the country
and its citizens. Far-reaching domestic reforms are
necessary and many deep structural failings,
which have driven a country into financial assis-
tance, have been only partially addressed in the
course of the programme.
This Policy Contribution assesses the risks for Ire-
land, Portugal and Greece of exit from financial
assistance programmes. Beyond domestic
reform, what can be done to improve growth
prospects? What support should a country receive
after exiting a financial assistance programme,
and under what conditions? The actual practice of
long-term surveillance and post-programme sup-
port are major issues that will determine both the
political acceptance of surveillance and the effec-
tiveness of the implementation of reforms.
EUROPEAN POLICY OPTIONS AND THE EU
FRAMEWORK
Greece, Ireland and Portugal will continue to have
close relationships with their European creditors
for a long time post-programme, given that the
average maturities of official EU loans are in
excess of 20 years.
The exact nature of the relationship between cred-
itors and debtor EU countries is laid down in EU
rules but depends on which of the three options
(clean exit, new programme or precautionary
credit line) is chosen at the end of the relevant pro-
gramme. But what is clear is that, for all countries,
the priority for a long period will be to keep public
finances in check and increase growth potential
to ensure debt sustainability.
Countries, like Ireland, choosing a clean exit, enter
into post-programme surveillance (PPS)2, which
stays in force until 75 percent of the outstanding
European Financial Stability Facility/European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism/European Sta-
bility Mechanism (EFSF/EFSM/ESM) loans have
2. PPS mirrors the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s
Post-Programme Monitor-
ing, laid down in IMF Deci-
sion 13454-(05/26). For
euro-area countries, the
details of PPS are set out in
Article 14 of Regulation
472/2013 on the strength-
ening of economic and
budgetary surveillance. PPS
entails specific reporting
requirements, which can be
extended on a case-to-case
basis in the country-spe-
cific Memorandum of
Understanding of a pro-
gramme. Moreover, the
member state under PPS
will be subject to regular
Commission review mis-
sions, in liaison with the
European Central Bank.
These report to the Eco-
nomic and Financial Com-
mittee, the European
Parliament and the relevant
national parliament. The
Eurogroup, on the basis of a
Commission proposal, can
recommend that the
member state under PPS
adopts corrective meas-
ures. For information on IMF
procedures, see
http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/ppm.htm.
3. See page 40 of European
Commission (2013c).
4. The criteria for judging
whether an ESM country is
eligible for a PCCL are: (a)
that it respects the commit-
ments under the stability
and growth pact; (b) a sus-
tainable general govern-
ment debt; (c) that it
respects the commitments
under the excessive imbal-
ance procedure (EIP); (d) a
track record of access to
international capital mar-
kets on reasonable terms;
(e) a sustainable external
position; and (f) the
absence of bank solvency
problems that would pose
systemic threats to the sta-
bility of the euro-area bank-
ing system.
‘Greece, Ireland and Portugal will continue to have close relationships with their European
creditors for a long time post-programme, given that the average maturities of official EU loans
are in excess of 20 years.’
5. See
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/articles/gover-
nance/2012-03-14_six_pack
_en.htm.
6. The last task force report
on Greece:
http://ec.europa.eu/com-
mission_2010-2014/presi-
dent/pdf/qr5_en.pdf.
programme exit will be crucial, because it would
be an illusion to assume that countries have been
able to address all their long-standing structural
problems during the three-year period of the pro-
gramme. Many of the problems, such as inefficient
state sectors, that resulted in low productivity
growth before the crisis in some of the programme
countries will take years to correct. Surveillance,
including by the EU, can play an important role by
pointing to the necessary reforms and encourag-
ing and influencing national discussions. The
weakest level of surveillance is the post-pro-
gramme surveillance, while under a precautionary
credit line, surveillance would be more intrusive,
and a new programme would come with a full set
of conditions.
Beyond surveillance, there are also ‘task forces’
for Greece and Portugal. These aim to provide tech-
nical assistance for the implementation of reforms
in combination with EU support mechanisms such
as Structural Funds. The Greek task force also pro-
vides support to the national anti-corruption strat-
egy and the sound functioning of tax
administration and government reform6. Such
forms of technical assistance could be available
also after programme exit, and could be combined
with assistance from the EU budget and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank. 
COUNTRY ANALYSES
When they lost affordable market access and in
the face of sizable bond repayments, the
governments of the four countries were forced to
make formal requests to the IMF and to European
authorities for financial assistance. All four
programmes cover three separate areas with
different emphases according to the country: (1)
deficit reduction and structural fiscal reform; (2)
financial sector reform; and (3) structural and
competitiveness reform. Substantial financial
assistance has already been granted (€215 billion
to Greece, €70.6 billion to Portugal and €66.7
billion to Ireland).
The four countries have a number of fragilities that
make exit and post-exit challenging: (a) high
public debt levels; (b) high private debt levels; (c)
high external debts; (d) socio-political issues
linked to high unemployment and inequitable
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financial assistance through an ECCL, which only
requires that the country’s general economic and
financial situation remains sound.
Countries granted an ECCL are subject to
enhanced surveillance by the European Commis-
sion while the credit line is available. Such sur-
veillance is less intrusive than under a regular (as
opposed to a precautionary) assistance pro-
gramme, but more intrusive than standard post-
programme surveillance of countries exiting
EFSM, ESM or EFSF programmes. Exit with a pre-
cautionary programme would thus both smooth
the path back to market access and would help
ensure that the reform process triggered by the
Troika will continue to be implemented, and
domestic structural reforms to boost growth will
be carried out. This is the reason why countries
that receive an ECCL are eligible for an ECB OMT
programme, which would give them an additional
safety net.
In common with all euro-area countries, fiscal
rules also apply to countries exiting financial
assistance programmes, whether they do so fully
or with a precautionary credit line. In addition to
the Six-pack and Two-pack rules that relate to the
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of the EU Treaty,
euro-area countries are also subject to the Fiscal
Compact enshrined in the intergovernmental
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)5.
The Six-pack introduced a debt rule that requires
high-debt countries to reduce their debt in excess
of 60 percent of GDP at an average rate of at least
5 percent per year. For example, if the debt-to-GDP
ratio is 120 percent in a year, then the rule should
result in a debt level of 111 percent three years
later. For countries in an EDP, the debt rule only
kicks in three years after the EDP is ended.  For
example, Ireland and Portugal would only be
obliged to comply with the debt rule in 2019, if
they comply with their commitment and correct
their excessive deficit in 2015, which would result
in the EDP being dropped in 2016.
Debt sustainability requires not only fiscal adjust-
ment but also measures to foster growth. The
capacity of programme countries to continue
undertaking growth-enhancing measures after
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7. On 14 November 2013,
the Eurogroup concluded
that the Irish economic
adjustment programme had
been successful and that
Ireland would be able to
exit. Statement by the
Eurogroup on Ireland,
November 14 2013.
http://www.consilium.europ
a.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs
/pressdata/en/ecofin/1395
79.pdf
income and tax-burden distribution, which imply
that the public debt burden is not equitably dis-
tributed. In each of these areas, the situation has
significantly deteriorated since the end of the
unsustainable booms (see Table 1). The deterio-
ration is a result of a combination of a collapse in
GDP levels and the continued accumulation of new
liabilities, now mostly from the government sector.
Financial sector reform has progressed yet non-
performing loans in all countries have increased
and are now at record highs, foreshadowing fur-
ther potential stress (Figure 1).
However, much has been achieved. The countries
have reduced deficits to more sustainable levels,
current-account deficits have been corrected, the
public sector has in some cases been reformed
and structural reforms have been implemented.
Consequently, the return to markets might be
more feasible now, notwithstanding questions
about debt sustainability. 
Table 1: Main macroeconomic indicators, 2009 and 2013 (% of GDP), Greece, Ireland and Portugal
Greece Ireland Portugal
2009 2013* 2009 2013* 2009 2013*
General government gross debt 129.7 176.2 64.4 124.4 83.7 127.8
Net international investment position (NIIP) -89.6 -108.8 -92.4 -112.0 -110.3 -115.4
Private debt 122.5 129.1 309.2 331.8 250.7 254.6
General government balance** -15.4 -4.9 -11.7 -7.2 -9.9 -5.8
Current account balance -14.4 -2.3 -2.3 4.1 -10.8 0.9
Unemployment rate 9.5 27.0 12.0 13.3 10.6 17.4
Ease of doing business ranking 96 72 7 15 48 31
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, AMECO, World Bank. Note: * Figures only up to 2012 for NIIP and private debt. ** Cleaned of the impact
of one-time items. Unemployment rate is in percent of labour force; Ease of doing business rank is among 181 countries in 2009 and 189
countries in 2013.
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Figure 1: Non-performing loans to total gross
loans in Greece, Ireland and Portugal
Source: Bruegel based on IMF Financial Soundness Indicators.
We perform a debt sustainability analysis to iden-
tify which countries face the greatest challenges,
and what measures would help deal with them.
Box 1 details the key assumptions. In addition to
a baseline scenario, we simulated the sensitivity
of the public debt-to-GDP ratio trajectory to four
adverse scenarios, singly and in combination: (1)
GDP growth is 1 percentage point slower than in
the baseline scenario in each year from 2014-30;
(2) the primary surplus is 1 percentage point of
GDP lower than in the baseline scenario in each
year from 2014-30; (3) interest rates for the float-
ing-rate liabilities are 100 basis points greater
than in the baseline scenario in each year from
2014-30; (4) at the end of 2014, governments
have to provide an additional 5 percent of GDP for
bank recapitalisation (which would amount to
between €8-€9 billion in the three countries); (5)
these four adverse scenarios in combination.
Ireland
Ireland was the first euro-area country to leave a
financial assistance programme and has been
under post-programme surveillance since Janu-
ary 20147. The key aim of the programme, namely
a return to the market, has been achieved. Figure
2 shows the results of our debt sustainability
analysis for Ireland. It highlights that in the base-
line scenario, debt-to-GDP levels will fall to 80 per-
cent of GDP by 2030, while in the four adverse
scenarios, the debt ratio would still fall well below
100 percent by 2030. However, when we combine
a number of negative shocks, the debt to GDP level
would stabilise and increase slightly by 2030. 
Considering the Six-pack’s debt-reduction rule, the
baseline scenario will comfortably satisfy the
8. For Greece, the Commis-
sion expects €21 billion pri-
vatisation revenue between
2014-20. The stock-flow
adjustment is sizable in all
three countries from 2014-
17: -6.4 percent of GDP for
Greece, -7.1 percent of GDP
for Ireland and -4.5 percent
of GDP for Portugal. For Ire-
land, most of this adjust-
ment is due to the expected
reduction of the govern-
ment’s cash balances from
13 percent of GDP to 6 per-
cent of GDP.
9. Consensus Economics
(2014).
10. Some of the loans are
indexed to the three-month
EURIBOR, which is expected
to increase from its current
0.3 percent per year value
to 2.7 percent by 2019. For
2020-30, we linked EURI-
BOR to the expected short
term German yields. The
new Irish government
bonds, which replaced the
earlier Promissory Notes,
are linked to the six-month
EURIBOR, while the bilateral
loan from the United King-
dom to Ireland is linked to
UK borrowing costs. We will
report full details about our
assumptions in a forthcom-
ing Bruegel working paper.
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requirement and instead of our 3.1 percent of GDP
long-run primary surplus assumption (Box 1), a
2.2 percent primary surplus (and an even lower
surplus later) would be sufficient during 2020-25
to meet the debt rule. But if the primary surplus
has to react to the combination of the other three
adverse scenarios (lower growth, higher interest
rates and additional bank recapitalisation), then a
4.9 percent of GDP primary surplus would be
needed on average in 2020-25 to achieve the
debt-reduction rule. This would be challenging. Ire-
land previously (from 1988-2000) had a 4.6 per-
cent of GDP average primary surplus, but during
that time, the primary surplus was supported by
BOX 1: DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
We take the European Commission’s November 2013 forecast for 2013 as the starting point for the
main economic indicators, and use the IMF’s October 2013 forecast for the primary balance and
nominal GDP growth for 2014-18 (the Commission’s forecast runs only until 2015). We consider the
privatisation schedule reported in the Commission’s country reports and also the so-called stock-
flow adjustment of debt8.
For the longer term, it is difficult to set baseline scenarios for growth and primary balance. For Greece,
the Commission expects a 4.0 percent of GDP persistent primary surplus during the 2020s and 3.9
percent nominal GDP growth. For Portugal, the Commission’s baseline is 2.6 percent primary sur-
plus and growth between 3.5 and 4.0 percent. For Ireland, the expected primary surplus is 4.6 per-
cent of GDP in 2020, but we have no information on the Commission's longer-term expectations. 
Such differences in assumptions make it difficult to compare the debt trajectories for the three
countries. For example, Portugal might have a higher than a 2.6 percent primary surplus should debt
sustainability be in danger, and for Ireland it might prove difficult to sustain a 4.6 percent primary
surplus throughout the 2020s. We therefore chose to assume the same long-run values for all three
countries.
There are few examples of advanced countries (except oil-rich Norway) being able to sustain high
levels of primary surpluses over long periods of time. As Abbas et al (2013) show, the average pri-
mary surplus for successful consolidations in advanced economies is 3.1 percent of GDP. We there-
fore assume that the three countries will gradually converge to this level by 2022, starting from the
2018 IMF forecast primary surplus, and will remain at 3.1 percent until 2030.
Similarly, it is difficult to forecast GDP growth for the 2020s. Market-based forecasts for the euro
area suggest 3.1 percent per year growth for 2022-26, according to Consensus Economics9. For
Spain, the figure is 3.7 percent per year, but unfortunately Consensus forecasts are not available for
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Given their structural weaknesses, it is difficult to see how the three
countries would be able to achieve much faster growth than the rest of the euro area in the long
term, after the current negative output gaps have been corrected. Therefore, and for simplicity, we
assumed that, taking the IMF’s forecast for 2018 as the starting point, annual growth in these coun-
tries will gradually converge to 3.7 (ie the Consensus Economics forecasts for Spanish growth) by
2022 and will remain at this level throughout the 2020s.
As for interest rates, we track the various liabilities of the three countries. We linked the interest rate
of floating-rate liabilities to the 6-year German Bund yield, which is expected to increase from its
0.8 percent value in February 2014 to 2.8 percent in 2020 and 3.3 percent in 2030. The EFSF spread
over the Bund is about 40 basis points, and we assumed this will remain the case. For newly issued
debt, we assumed the following spreads over the Bund: 100 basis points in Ireland (2014 onwards),
150 basis points for Portugal (to be reached by 2015) and 200 basis points for Greece (to be reached
by 2022)10.
For Greece, the 27 November 2012 agreement included the deferral of interest payments of most
EFSF loans by 10 years, in order to reduce the funding needs during this period. But the deferred
interest has to be paid back and therefore it does not constitute a debt reduction. Therefore we do
not consider the interest deferral in our simulations.
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7.0 percent per year real (and 10.8 percent nom-
inal) growth.
To achieve debt sustainability and enable a return
to the markets, it was important to improve the
terms of financial assistance in favour of the Irish
(and also the Portuguese) government. The
lending rate margins on the EFSM and EFSF loans
were eliminated and the average maturity
extended from 7.5 to 12.5 years in 2011 and
again to 19.5 years in 2013. In addition, Ireland
does not have to repay any EFSM/EFSF principal
before 2026, leading to a smaller borrowing need
from markets. These measures facilitate market
access and reduce the burden on taxpayers.
A second important factor in re-establishing
market access was the tremendous success in
the export sector. The flexibility of the Irish econ-
omy allowed for a relatively quick adaptation of
the country to the different circumstances.  It also
meant the impact of the fiscal adjustment on the
economy was reduced. Recent employment fig-
ures are encouraging.
A cash buffer of €20 billion was deemed sufficient
to guarantee the robustness of programme exit as
it would cover the estimated financing needs for
about one year. Yet, the robustness of the exit is
not guaranteed. The most significant risks relate
to the financial sector and the global economic
recovery. Ireland's good external performance
depends on economic growth in its most impor-
tant trading partners. There are now increasing
doubts about the robustness of the global recov-
ery, including in emerging economies, in the euro
area and even the US. The financial sector could
be further hit by non-performing loans, which have
been increasing almost steadily since 201011.
Cleaning these loans out of the banking system
will be a central task for the new EU Single Super-
visory Mechanism12. Changes in the personal
insolvency law and institutional changes in the
mortgage markets are ongoing, which will hope-
fully address the non-performing loan problem.
However, perhaps too much hope has been put in
bank profits to achieve the recapitalisation of
banks13. Therefore, the planned reduction of the
cash buffer by more than one half, which is the
major factor behind the expectation of a debt ratio
fall in 2014, could weaken the positive market
sentiment towards Ireland, and therefore we sug-
gest instead to keep the cash buffer and borrow at
the present favourable rates.
Overall, we conclude that Ireland successfully
exited the programme but that the exit is not com-
pletely robust. The adjustment left behind major
social problems14. A central post-exit objective is
to finish the clean-up and the recapitalisation of
the financial system, a task in which the new
common supervisor will play a central role. The
medium-term debt dynamics look quite benign
even under an adverse scenario. 
Portugal
Despite a number of political difficulties, Portugal
has implemented the Troika’s budgetary recom-
mendations. Its deficit will not return below 3 per-
cent of GDP in 2013 as originally foreseen by the
programme, nor will it in 2014, but it is on track to
do so in 2015. The debt-to-GDP ratio may have
peaked on schedule in 2013, but by that time it
was 13 points higher than initially foreseen. The
main reason for this slippage is Portugal's contin-
ued growth under-performance, which is also the
main reason why unemployment has reached
nearly 18 percent, well above programme expec-
tation. Nevertheless, markets remain well dis-
posed towards Portugal. In January 2014, Portugal
successfully issued €3.25 billion of 5-year debt
at a 4.657 percent yield, and 10-year bond yields
in secondary markets are now around 5 percent,
though still 175 basis points above Ireland.
11. Although the European
Commission reports that
data on the last quarters of
2013 shows a stabilisation
of non-performing loans,
they remain at very high
levels: European Commis-
sion (2013c).
12. If weak balance sheets
lead to an evergreening of
loans and a zombification of
the banking system, then
the recovery will prove illu-
sionary (Merler and Wolff,
2013).
13. The Commission
(2013c, p 29) argues that a
“return to profitability is
essential for banks to meet
their future capital thresh-
olds...”.
14. For example, the share
of children aged 0-17 living
in jobless households was
the highest in Ireland
among EU countries in
2012. 
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Figure 2: Irish public debt ratio scenarios (% GDP)
Source: Bruegel. Note: see Box 1 for main assumptions.
There are three reasons for positive market senti-
ment towards Portugal. First, there is increased
market confidence in the stability of the euro area
in general and in programme countries in particu-
lar. Second, there has been throughout the pro-
gramme a high degree of mutual understanding
and close cooperation between the Portuguese
authorities, the Troika and institutional market par-
ticipants. Third, and because of the trust that Por-
tugal has managed to build, market participants
believe that Portugal will receive all the necessary
support to be able to exit the programme on
schedule in May 2014.
Despite this positive sentiment, based on our
analysis (Figure 3), it would be unwise for Portu-
gal, and for the euro area, if Portugal were to exit
the programme in June 2014 without having
secured precautionary financial assistance from
the ESM via its enhanced conditions credit line
(ECCL) facility. This view should not be taken as a
negative judgement on what Portugal has
achieved since the start of the programme. It has
corrected major macroeconomic imbalances. But
it continues to suffer from long-standing structural
weaknesses that were already evident when the
country adopted the euro and that should have
been corrected during the benign years that pre-
ceded the crisis. For this reason, the Portuguese
economy will remain weak and vulnerable to
potential shocks for some time to come15.
Portugal’s predicament can be judged by compar-
ing the situation expected by the Troika for 2014-
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15 and the situation before the crisis, when
according to Blanchard (2007) “Portugal faced an
unusually tough economic challenge: low growth,
low productivity growth, high unemployment,
large fiscal and current account deficits”. Although
the current-account deficit will be much lower and
public deficit will also be somewhat lower than
before the crisis, unemployment and public debt
will be about double what they were pre-crisis.
Debt and social sustainability will be central and
sustainability depends on growth. The problem
that Portugal faces is that it needs to change its
pre-crisis growth model, which produced stagna-
tion after the country joined the euro. Such change
takes time. But without it, the combination of high
debt, high nominal interest rates and low nominal
GDP growth would render the debt unsustainable.   
Major weaknesses of the Portuguese economy are
the low degree of competition in non-traded activ-
ities, the very small size of firms and the difficulty
in obtaining financing. The Troika programme's
structural reform agenda aimed precisely to boost
competitiveness and redirect economic activity
from non-traded to traded activities. However,
these measures take time to implement and will
need to continue after exit.
Based on this analysis, we believe Portugal and
its euro-area partners should be cautious when
the issue of exiting the Troika programme is on the
ECOFIN Council’s April 2014 agenda, one month
before the programme expires. All parties might
be tempted by a clean exit in order to claim politi-
cal success, but the economy’s continued struc-
tural weakness makes it desirable that the exit be
accompanied by a precautionary programme and
related enhanced surveillance, which could help
Portugal as it continues to pursue a deep struc-
tural reform process that will be necessary for
many years. A further reason for caution is that
Portugal has no history of maintaining high pri-
mary surpluses over extended periods. In addi-
tion, creditor countries should offer Portugal even
longer maturities on EFSF/ESM loans to reduce its
future debt burden. 
Greece
Greece faced an extraordinarily difficult situation
when it entered a financial assistance programme
in May 2010. Its debt and deficit problems and its
15. We note that in our
baseline scenario, Portugal
will just meet the debt
reduction rule in the early
2020s. Note however that
our 3.1 percent of GDP long-
term primary surplus base-
line is higher than the
European Commission
(2013b) assumption.
Should the primary surplus
need to react to the combi-
nation of the other three
adverse scenarios (lower
growth, higher interest rates
and additional bank recapi-
talisation), then a 6.1 per-
cent of GDP primary surplus
would be needed on aver-
age in 2020-2025. This will
probably not be achievable.
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Figure 3: Portuguese public debt ratio scenarios
(% GDP)
Source: Bruegel. Note: see Box 1 for main assumptions.
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serious external imbalances were significant.
Greece underwent a significant adjustment of both
its current account and its public deficit, yet in the
process, GDP fell very significantly and unem-
ployment increased very substantially. It is diffi-
cult to envisage an exit from financial assistance
at the end of the current programme.
Greek public debt cannot be financed under the
current programme assumptions. As highlighted
in the media, there is a short-term financing gap
in the next few years amounting to about €12 bil-
lion. For this reason, the possibility of a third pro-
gramme has been raised along with extending the
maturity of the Greek loan facility to 50 years and
reducing its spread over the three-month EURIBOR
to zero. In our scenarios we have already taken
into account this maturity extension and spread
reduction, and we also take into account a further
extension of EFSF loans to Greece so that Greece
does not have to repay any principal to European
lenders until 2030. To indicate a change in the cur-
rent financing conditions, we talk about a ‘revised
baseline’ instead of ‘baseline’ as we did in the
cases of Ireland and Portugal.
According to this revised baseline scenario, Greek
public debt will be reduced to 124 percent of GDP
by 2020, 120 percent by 2021 and 95 percent by
2030. By 2030, Greece would need to accumulate
€74 billion of newly issued debt, partly to pay
back maturing debt to the IMF, the ECB, national
central banks and private creditors.
If borrowing such an amount at a rate of 200 basis
points above the Bund (as we assumed, Box 1) is
feasible is an open issue. But what is even more
important is that there is a more fundamental
problem with the financing of the debt: the base-
line debt trajectory is exposed to risks, which can
easily jeopardise a more significant reduction in
the debt ratio and may even put it on an escalating
path (Figure 4). Such risks make it is difficult to
imagine how Greece can borrow at an affordable
rate from the market after the expiry of the second
financial assistance programme in late 2014.
Scenario (4) would push up the level of debt by 5
percentage points of GDP in 2014 (and slightly
more in later years due to interest payments on
this new debt), while the first three scenarios each
would lead to an approximately 120 percent of
GDP debt ratio by 2030, with accumulated new
market borrowing at about €145 billion. Under the
four scenarios in combination, it would not be pos-
sible to stabilise even the debt ratio after 2020,
when nominal GDP growth rate is assumed to slow
down and the primary surplus is reduced. In this
combined scenario, the debt ratio is expected to
climb back above 170 percent of GDP by 2030
with an accumulated stock of new private borrow-
ing of €253 billion. One can say with great confi-
dence that markets would not lend to Greece with
a 200 basis points spread over the Bund (our
maintained assumption) in such a scenario.
Therefore, while the revised baseline scenario
could lead to a major reduction of debt, it would be
very sensitive to adverse shocks. The uncertainty
concerning the financing of public debt would
have a negative impact on the economy and
would likely hinder investment.
The preferred option would be to take Greece out of
the market until 2030 under a third programme,
and develop a contingency plan in case the debt
trajectory worsens beyond the control of the gov-
ernment. Such a plan should consist of:
1 Greece should be required to reach a balanced
budget by 2018 and to avoid any subsequent
deficit. According to our calculations, if the pri-
mary-surplus plans and the full amount of €21
billion privatisation revenue during 2014-20
are realised, this would necessitate a primary
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16. The New Greek bonds,
which resulted from the
March 2012 debt restructur-
ing, are safeguarded by a
cofinancing clause with the
EFSF, ie any Greek govern-
ment debt service arrears
have to be distributed pro
rata by the New Greek
bonds and the service of
the EFSF loans which were
granted to finance the PSI
Payment Notes and
Accrued Interest Notes. See
Zettelmeyer et al (2013).
17. Darvas (2012) also pro-
posed zero-interest lending,
but not conditionally, and
he also proposed indexing
the notional amount of all
official loans to Greek GDP,
which would help to avoid a
rise in the debt ratio if GDP
diasppoints, but would also
benefit European lenders if
growth turns out to be faster
than expected. Such an
indexing countinues make
sence, but there does not
seem to be political support
for it.
18. The recent plan of Pâris
and Wyplosz (2014), which
would involve borrowing
from the market €4.5 tril-
lion, acquiring at face value
a large share of existing
public debts of all euro-area
countries in a neutral coun-
try-composition, and swap-
ping them into zero-interest
perpetuities whereby the
losses made on these oper-
ations (borrowing has a
cost, while zero interest is
earned) would be financed
by ECB losses and future
profits, would likely reach
resistance, because several
policymakers would view
these operations as quasi-
fiscal operations contami-
nating the balance sheet of
the ECB.
surplus of about 4 percent of GDP from 2022
onwards. Under this scenario, the Greek budget
would reach an overall surplus of about half a
percent of GDP by 2030.
2 In such a scenario, a third financial assistance
programme amounting to about €40 billion up
to 2030 would fill the financing gap, ie Greece
would not need to borrow from the market. Main-
taining the 4 percent primary surplus would not
necessitate borrowing in the 2030s either, since
the overall budget surplus would increase and
would cover the maturing private debt.
3 European partners should help Greece (and
also other periphery countries) with much
more forceful programmes for supporting
economic growth. In particular, much greater
European investment in Greece should help
kick-start growth. In the near term, the
European Investment Bank (EIB) seems to be
the best institution to carry out such an
investment programme, since the EIB has the
expertise to invest. Therefore, much more
capital should be provided to the EIB beyond
the €10 billion agreed at the 29 June 2012
European Council. The internal procedures of
the EIB should be revived to allow faster
deployment of investment.
4 Even if Greece fulfils its fiscal adjustment, pri-
vatisation and structural reform commitments,
and Greek growth is supported from Europe, the
debt trajectory is subject to shocks and there-
fore a contingency plan is needed. Requiring a
steady-state primary surplus much in excess
of 4 percent is not realistic. Since the share of
remaining private sector creditors in Greek
public debt is very low and creditors are safe-
guarded by strong legal provisions16, only cer-
tain forms of official sector involvement (OSI)
would remain. We propose that if Greece fulfils
its commitments, but there is a sizable devia-
tion from the baseline debt ratio reduction,
interest payments to European lenders should
be forgiven to the extent necessary to return
the debt ratio to the baseline17.
According to our calculations, forgiving interest
payments on loans from European lenders would
provide  sufficient room for manoeuvre even under
sizable adverse shocks. In our view, such an
approach would be the least unacceptable to Euro-
pean lenders. An outright debt reduction would
face major resistance from lenders and its neces-
sity is unclear at the moment, since in our revised
baseline the debt ratio declines steadily and with
a third programme Greece could be taken out of
the market until 2030 and beyond. A retrospective
bank recapitalisation by the ESM (whereby the
ESM would purchase banks shares from the Greek
government, which would use the money to pay
back loans), would face similar resistance18.
At the same time, an announced European sup-
port plan underpinning a mutually agreed debt
reduction ratio, along with the lack of any need for
market-based funding and a major European
investment programme in Greece, would help to
alleviate the negative impact on economic per-
formance of Greece's still high public debt. Euro-
pean lenders would maintain their leverage over
Greece, since any decision on interest forgiveness
would be made when needed, ie when there is sig-
nificant negative deviation from the baseline. In
addition the continuous presence of the Troika
would keep up the momentum for reform.
Certainly, this plan would be subject to moral
hazard, but we think the moral hazard involved
would be less than for other debt reduction
options. Greece might not meet its commitments,
either deliberately or unintentionally, and may
count on European support to forgive interest pay-
ments. Other OSI options would result in one-time
and much larger debt relief, and European lever-
age over Greece would be reduced compared to
our proposal. And if Greece does not comply with
its commitments and the European partners do
not yield, the alternative is a possibly messy
default and exit from the euro area, which would
be particularly painful for Greece, even if it would
have also negative impacts for the euro area.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To conclude, Ireland, Portugal and Greece continue
to be vulnerable to sovereign debt problems
because of their high debt levels, though to differ-
ent extents. In particular, we have shown that
under the IMF growth and primary balance projec-
tions up to 2018, and longer-term assumptions
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19. See OECD (2013).
based on historical experience with the primary
balance and Consensus Economics forecasts on
growth, the public debt ratio is set to decline in all
three countries. However, the debt trajectory is
vulnerable to negative growth, primary balance
and interest rate shocks – though we do not exam-
ine extremely negative scenarios – especially in
Greece and Portugal, though also in Ireland. In all
three countries, annual monitoring of the debt-to-
GDP ratios and projections is therefore necessary.
In the case of Greece, we propose a four-point
plan: Greece will need to reach a balanced budget
by 2018. Since a return to markets will likely prove
impossible, a third financial assistance pro-
gramme amounting to about €40 billion up to
2030 would fill the financing gap, ie Greece would
not need to borrow from the market at all. Such a
baseline would include further lengthening of
European lending to Greece and the reduction of
the interest rate spread to zero on the Greek Loan
Facility. Greece could be taken out from the market
until 2030 and even beyond by such a third pro-
gramme amounting if the primary surplus and pri-
vatisation targets are reached. Continued effort is
needed to increase Greek growth. Continued sur-
veillance will be beneficial to foster change and
could also be a positive signal to investors. Fur-
ther measures to kick start growth will be neces-
sary and should include additional funding for
investment. New ideas – such as introducing a
competition among regions on good governance
to access funds – should be explored. Further
measures to enhance competition should be pur-
sued19.
Greece's debt trajectory would still be vulnerable
to negative shocks, in which case debt dynamics
would derail. In such a case, the funding gap could
only be closed by reducing interest rates below
funding costs or touching the principal. The
Eurogroup should announce its readiness to
reduce EFSF/ESM lending rates to zero if there is a
significant deviation from the baseline scenario,
provided the country implements the required
reforms and achieves the required primary budget
surplus. Announcing such readiness is crucial.
Otherwise the risk is that high public debt will con-
tinue to undermine investment. What should be
borne in mind, however, is that zero lending rates
go against EFSF/ESM rules, which would need to
be modified. In addition, obviously, EFSF/ESM
shareholders would have to pick up the tab to
make up for the difference between lending rates
and borrowing costs.  
For Portugal, a clean exit in May 2014 is not advis-
able. Instead, a precautionary credit line would
help to make the exit more sustainable and robust
while at the same time keeping up the momentum
for economic reform through stronger surveil-
lance. Such an exit represents a rational choice in
the face of large re-financing needs, even after sig-
nificant progress in the last three years. Yet, if a
less optimistic scenario materialises, debt dynam-
ics could become unsustainable. In such a case,
appropriate measures such as debt restructuring
would need to be put in place. There is also still
room to lengthen maturities on EFSF/ESM loans to
Portugal.
Ireland has already exited and the challenge will
be to increase the resilience of its economy to new
shocks. Recapitalising and restructuring the bank-
ing system will be a central part of this. We also
would advise the maintenance of a significant
cash buffer as an insurance against shocks. Over-
all, debt dynamics in Ireland look healthy, though
combined negative shocks could reverse the debt-
ratio reduction.
The euro-area periphery will continue to need sup-
port. Programme countries are in for a very long-
term relationship with creditors under PPS.
Defining PPS well will be the key to the political
and economic success of exit. This should focus
on triggering growth, and the EIB, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
World Bank could play more prominent roles. But
the euro-area periphery will also depend on the
recovery of the euro area as a whole. Bringing
inflation back to the target of two percent is of fun-
damental importance for the sustainability of debt
for the countries exiting financial assistance pro-
grammes, as well as for Spain and Italy. Higher
economic growth in the core euro-area countries
will also be important, to different degrees, for the
trade performance of periphery countries.
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